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ABSTRACT 
 
The present study examines cross-national and sectoral differences in Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) in fourteen European countries and ten sectors from 1995 to 2007. The main aim is to 
ascertain the role of employment protection of temporary contracts on TFP by estimating their 
effects with a “difference-in-difference” approach. Results show that deregulation of temporary 
contracts negatively influences the growth rates of TFP in European economies and that, within 
sectoral analysis, the role of this liberalisation is greater in industries where firms are more used 
to opening short-term positions. By contrast, in our observation period, restrictions on regular 
jobs do not cause significant effects on TFP, whereas limited regulation of product markets and 
higher R&D expenses positively affect efficiency growth.  
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1. Introduction1 
The present paper analyses productivity disparities in EU economies over a period (1995-2007) 
which has witnessed a marked slow-down in average European efficiency growth and 
significant intra-Europe cross-country diversities. Other studies have shown that, from the mid-
1990s until 2005, EU countries have lost ground with respect to the US, not because of adverse 
changes in labour composition, or insufficient rates of capital accumulation, but due to the lack 
of innovation capability (van Ark et al. 2008, Inklaar et al. 2008). These prior works also found 
                                                            
1
 A first version of this paper was presented at the Workshop ‘Capital deepening labour flexibility and 
productivity’, 21 December 2010 (Dipartimento di Metodi e modelli per l’economia, il territorio e la finanza, 
Memotef, Università degli Studi ‘La Sapienza’ di Roma, and Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ‘H.P. 
Minsky ’Università degli Studi di Bergamo, Italy). We are grateful to the discussants Paolo Piacentini and 
Roberto Torrini. We also thank Nicola Acocella, Riccardo Leoni and other participants to the workshop for 
their useful comments. All errors remain ours. 
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that a prominent role in explaining EU divergences was played by Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) growth, the efficiency component which reflects disembodied technical changes, not 
embodied in the quality of inputs, and attributable to organisational and institutional 
determinants. In this article, we update the analysis to 2007 and, in particular, examine the 
effect of labour regulation in explaining TFP heterogeneity within the EU economies, taking a 
closer look at the role of labour market reforms covering temporary jobs.  
From the mid-1990s onwards, large-scale liberalisations of labour markets have been recorded 
in Europe and, among the main policy turnarounds are new regulatory frameworks for 
temporary contracts. These kinds of reform have characterised various countries, albeit at 
different speeds, and have been more frequently adopted than changes in rules for regular jobs. 
The main aim of this paper is thus to ascertain the role of these institutional changes in 
explaining the ample differentials in TFP recorded in EU economies. This was done by making 
industry-level cross-country estimates which verify whether provisions regulating employment 
contracts are more stringent in those sectors where the propensity to use temporary 
arrangements is higher. 
There is limited empirical evidence on the relationship between employment protection and 
productivity. So far, many studies have considered employment protection as a cost incurred by 
firms, and the focus has been on employment and labour market flows. Among others, Bentolila 
and Bertola (1990) have shown that firing costs prevent lay-offs and discourage hiring, with an 
ambiguous overall influence on employment. Other works have analysed the relationship 
between labour market flows and jobs security provisions, reaching similar conclusions 
(Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Bertola and Rogerson, 1997; Garibaldi, 1998; Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson, 1993; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Garibaldi and Violante, 2005).  
However, employment protection affects human capital accumulation and productivity, not only 
labour market flows. Especially in environments where training cannot be contracted between 
firms and workers because of the unverifiable and unenforceable nature of firm-specific human 
capital investments, economies are characterised by under-investment equilibria and, in turn, 
excessive lay-offs, lower job creation and sub-optimal outcomes (Belot and van Ours, 2007, 
Ricci and Waldman, 2010). In these contexts, restrictions on labour flexibility may represent  a 
contractual solution to the under-provision of firm-financed training; conversely, liberalisation 
favouring short-term contracts may induce detrimental effects. 
It should be noted that, in the related literature, few studies have estimated the influence of 
aggregate measures of employment protection on productivity, and most of the existing 
literature, like the works of Nickell and Layard (1999) and Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008), has 
3 
 
used aggregate regression analysis to examine the relationship between employment protection 
legislation (EPL) and productivity. However, the validity of these kinds of investigations may 
be limited by confounding factors which influence the cross-country effects of EPL. This 
problem is handled by Micco and Pages (2006) and Bassanini et al. (2009), who use a 
difference-in-difference approach which can estimate the influence of country institutional 
variables by controlling for industry effects. The present paper adopts the same difference-in-
difference approach and offers estimates for more recent years, 1995-2007. Its major 
contribution is also that it pays special attention to the regulation of temporary jobs, rather than 
aggregate measures of employment protection or protection of regular jobs, as done by the 
above authors. Two-tier reforms rather than liberalisation of permanent jobs, as noted above, 
were recorded in our estimation period, leading us to examine their role in explaining TFP 
patterns.  
We find that deregulation of temporary workers negatively influences TFP growth rates in 
European economies, while changes in the restriction of regular jobs have no significant effect 
on efficiency patterns. Within sectoral analysis, the effects of EPLT liberalisation policies are 
greater in industry where firms are more used to making staff changes by opening short-term 
positions, whereas excessive product market regulation negatively influences TFP growth.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature which has explored the 
causal links between employment protection and productivity. Section 3 presents data and 
sources; Section 4 offers some descriptive statistics concerning the key variables used in the 
econometric analysis. Section 5 discusses econometric strategy and estimates, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Employment protection and productivity: relative literature 
 
Many studies have analysed the influence of labour protection on employment and unemployment 
rates, or on unemployment inflows and outflows, but have reserved less space to productivity 
growth. For instance, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) examined the role of firing 
costs in limiting lay-offs and discouraging hiring, with ambiguous overall influence on employment 
rates; similar conclusions were reached by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) who found that EPL 
restrictions negatively influence job mobility. However, employment protection affects not only 
labour market flows, but also productivity and welfare, as we discuss below.  
Indeed, the deeper motives for promoting labour market flexibility are found in the theoretical 
literature on the potential costs of labour protection, which may generate direct and indirect effects 
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on efficiency growth. This protection, as argued by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Bertola 
(1994), perturbs the reallocation of resources from declining firms to more dynamic ones with 
above-average productivity growth. In addition, these protective devices tend to alter the allocation 
of resources among sectors. Economies with rigid labour markets show distortions in their 
innovation activities, since they adopt mainly secondary innovations, which cause cost reductions in 
existing goods, but they do not experiment with primary innovations, such as those related to new 
products, characterised by higher returns but also higher variance (Saint Paul, 2002). 
Other key channels able to explain unfavourable consequences are related to capital returns and 
worker effort. Turnover costs, determined by obstacles to labour mobility, reduce returns on 
investments and cause a slower rate of growth, as shown by Bertola (1994). Similar negative effects 
are brought about by worker incentives, since labour protection lowers the probabilities of lay-offs 
for disciplinary reasons; under less threat of dismissal, opportunistic behaviour is encouraged (Boeri 
and Jimeno, 2005). 
In addition, in the case of rigid regulations for permanent contracts, temporary workers play a role 
as ‘buffer stock’, since firms can adjust their workforces by varying the number of temporary 
contracts, thus quickly responding to demand and technological change. However, as theoretically 
argued by Blanchard and Landier (2002), deregulation of temporary contracts may merely increase 
the turnover in the labour market, rather than being “stepping stones” to permanent jobs, since the 
latter types of jobs remain costly to dissolve due to severe restrictions on dismissals. Blanchard and 
Landier also offer evidence for the French case - over the period 1983-2000 - which unambiguously 
confirms that partial reforms of employment protection may be perverse: when firms are allowed to 
hire workers on fixed-term contracts and keep them beyond those contracts, they cannot freely 
choose for later separation, which is normally subject to firing costs. In the same vein, Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2007) focus on the transitional “honeymoon effect” of labour market reforms, aimed at 
allowing some flexibility by implementing reforms ‘at the margin’. Two-tier reforms, as argued by 
the authors with a dynamic model of labour demand, verified for the Italian case, produce an 
increase in the short-run of employment, but also a slowdown in productivity, due to a decrease in 
marginal returns of labour services2.  
                                                            
2
 Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) examine the Italian experience in the period 1995-2000 and focus on the 
“honeymoon effect” of labour market reforms, aimed at allowing some flexibility by implementing reforms 
at the margin, i.e., those involving fixed-term but not open-end contracts. For the Italian case, other evidence 
has been obtained by examining the role of exemption clauses exonerating small firms from job security 
norms (Schivardi and Torrini, 2008). 
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Temporary contracts may also exert two probable but opposing effects on productivity. On one 
hand, they favour all reallocation processes triggered by shocks in technology or demand which call 
for faster adaptation and job changes. They may also have an incentive effect, under the assumption 
that fixed-term workers aim at obtaining permanent positions; hence, these arrangements may be 
screen devices to select new employees, and are thus potential “stepping stones to generally 
preferable permanent jobs” (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2004, p. 2).  
Wasmer (2006) uses a matching model to show that employment protection, by reducing turnover 
and labour mobility, shifts human capital accumulation towards specific skills. In particular, 
workers are induced to invest in firm-specific skills when the employment relationship is expected 
to last. This kind of specialisation improves their productivity and makes it possible for them to 
obtain wages above their outside options. By contrast, workers tend to invest much more in general 
skills when they perceive a high risk of losing their jobs, as in the absence of employment 
protection.  
Belot, Boone and van Ours (2007) also stress that, when effort and investments in human capital are 
non-contractible, employment protection solves hold-up problems. Protection of this kind 
encourages employees to invest in match-specific human capital by increasing the probability of the 
survival of the match, and this beneficial effect is stronger in those sectors where firm specialisation 
in competences is more important. This result is also relevant in all contexts where risk-averse 
employees are liquidity-constrained and cannot obtain insurance against dismissals. However, there 
is a trade-off between these positive effects and the negative consequences of EPL, which also 
raises the costs of separation. Belot, Boone and van Ours suggest an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between employment protection and economic growth: there is a positive optimal level of 
employment protection, so that, over some ranges, increasing employment protection does improve 
welfare. The exact level of optimal employment protection depends on other labour market 
institutions, such as minimum wages and wage bargaining institutions. 
More general results, not conditioned by the presence of risk-averted employees and financial 
imperfections, are obtained by Ricci and Waldman (2010). In their matching model, à la 
Mortensen-Pissarides (1994), in which firms finance training of their employees, the introduction of 
a firing tax reduces hold-ups and opportunistic behaviour by employers and acts as a Pareto 
improving policy. Indeed, when the amount of training is chosen in the first stage of employment 
relations, while the returns are realised at the second stage, workers are not able to influence the 
amount of training, which is chosen unilaterally by firms. In this economy, a firing tax combined 
with the use of hiring subsidies always increases the level of training, as well as job tenure, with 
unambiguous positive effects on welfare. The new firing tax imposes a second-order cost on the 
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firm, but induces a first-order benefit to the worker, since it solves the hold-up problem: On 
political grounds, a firing tax for newly hired workers finds less resistance if the tax revenue 
derived from separations is used to subsidise new hiring. In sum, a well-designed policy which 
combines firing taxes for newly hired personnel and hiring subsidies acts as a Pareto improving 
intervention. 
Concerning empirical evidence, and limiting our short review to comparative studies, it must be 
noted that a few works have estimated the relationship between EPL and productivity in cross-
country (Nickell and Layard 1999; Autor et al. 2007; Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008) or industry-
level cross-country studies (Micco and Pages, 2006; Bassanini et al., 2009). So far, these empirical 
studies offer contradictory findings. For instance, Layard and Nickell (1999) performed cross-
country estimates of labour productivity growth over the period 1976-1992, in which it appears that 
employment protection is the only institution that has a positive effect on labour productivity 
growth in OECD countries; the rationale behind this is that productivity improvements depend on 
workers' cooperation and on-the-job training investments which, in turn, are favoured by firing 
costs.  
Autor et al. (2007), using cross-state differences in the US, consider the adoption of wrongful 
discharge protection by US state courts from the late 1970s to the early 1990s and estimate  the 
influence of dismissal costs on the distortion of production choices and thus on productivity. Their 
estimates suggest that job protection reduces TFP and firm entry, but increases capital investments. 
Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) detect significant positive effects of EPL as well as of 
unemployment protection, measured by average replacement rates.  
Belot, Boone and van Ours (2007) perform an empirical analysis of cross-country time-series data 
(17 OECD countries and three periods, ranging from the early 1960s to the late 1990s) and find that 
employment protection legislation, as predicted by their model, briefly described above, has a non-
linear relationship with economic growth. 
The limitation of these previous works is that the effects of labour policies, defined at aggregate 
level, may be obscured by confounding factors which influence cross-country (cross-state) 
variations. This problem is handled by recent studies which use a difference-in-difference approach 
and estimate the influence of country institutional variables by controlling for industry effects. If 
EPL has a different effect on sectors, EPL non-binding sectors are used as a control for EPL-
binding sectors, i.e., for the ‘treated’ group. This method was applied by Micco and Pages (2006) to 
a sample of 16 OECD and 18 non-OECD countries. They found that stricter job security regulation, 
as measured by alternative indicators, slows down job turnover, and that the magnitudes of these 
effects are larger in sectors which are intrinsically more volatile. However, they also found less 
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robust results for productivity. Clearer and robust results are obtained by Bassanini et al. (2009), 
who adopt the difference-in-difference method for a sample of OECD countries for the period 1982-
2003. They mainly focus on labour protection of regular contracts and estimate that dismissal 
restrictions have a negative effect on productivity growth, especially in sectors where firing 
restrictions are more binding. The estimated effect of protection of permanent contracts remains 
negative and significant when protection of temporary contracts is controlled for. In contrast, for the 
latter form of regulation, they find either positive or no influence on TFP. 
The exploration of the role of temporary job restrictions and their effect on TFP growth is the main 
aim of our estimates for more recent years (1995-2007). 
 
3 Data and sources 
Our empirical investigation relies on several databases, EU KLEMS accounts, the OECD indexes 
on employment protection and product marker regulation, and EUROSTAT.  
The key variables used to study the influence of employment protection and product market 
regulation on TFP growth, as well as other control variables, are included in these different 
databases; thus, the first step of our research involved matching them and carrying out 
disaggregated analysis at sector and country levels. First, the availability of data and the needs of a 
large and consistent sector-country profile led us to select only 14 countries out of the 27 European 
Union members and to re-arrange the NACE rev.1 sections into 10 industries.  
This made it possible to compare the following economies: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. This selection, as noted above, was dictated by data availability and 
includes two sets of countries: i) 12 Old Member States; ii) 2 New Member States. The second 
small set comprises Hungary and the Czech Republic, two “market-oriented” economies with 
some similarities to the Anglo-Saxon countries (European Commission, 2004). 
The selected sectors consist of: 1) Agriculture; 2) Mining and Quarrying, 3) Manufacturing; 4) 
Energy sectors), 5) Construction, 6) Wholesale and Retail Trade, 7) Hotels and Restaurants, 8) 
Transport, Storage and Communications, 9) Financial Intermediation, Real Estate and Business 
Services, 10) Community, Social and Personal Services. 
We drew the dependent variable of our econometric estimates, TFP growth, from the EU KLEMS 
database, which was extensively used in the study by van Ark et al. (2008). One of the main 
advantages of this database is the detailed breakdown of industries and service sectors and the 
decomposition of labour productivity; it is also worth noting that this decomposition was 
computed by considering differences in labour quality (highly skilled, medium-skilled and low-
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skilled) and a full variety of asset types (distinction between ICT capital and non-ICT capital 
services). 
In addition, following Bassanini et al. (2009), we used EU KLEMS to estimate TFP levels, which 
allowed us to compute the distance of TFP from the technological frontier, i.e., the ratio of TFP in 
a specific country and industry to the TFP level of the leader in that industry (Aghion and Griffith, 
2005; Griffith et al., 2004).  
Other variables used in the descriptive analysis, value added and the contribution of inputs to 
growth, were also obtained from the EU KLEMS database. 
The set of key explanatory variables related to labour and product market regulation, i.e., 
employment protection legislation for regular and temporary workers (EPLR and EPLT, 
respectively) and product market regulation (PMR), are given by the OECD database.  
Important explanatory variables of TFP used as controls, particularly those describing unmeasured 
innovative input, sectoral R&D expenses, standardised to value added, were taken from 
EUROSTAT. The same database was used to gather the share of workers with temporary jobs to 
total employees at sector-country level. We also introduced, in our difference-in-difference model, 
the sectoral average level of this ratio for the UK as a benchmark, i.e., as the underlying 
propensity to use temporary workers, in the absence of EPLT. In addition, in the descriptive 
analysis we used the proportion of temporary workers by sector and country, for information on 
actual utilisation of labour market flexibility. 
Lastly, UK industry-level layoff rates, defined as the percentage ratio of annual lay-offs to total 
employment, were introduced as a proxy for lay-off propensity in the absence of EPL, and were 
obtained from the waves of the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey, released by the Office of 
National Statistics. 
 
4 Descriptive statistics  
 
4.1 Cross- country productivity differentials 
Study of the relationship between regulatory framework and TFP, presented below, is accompanied 
by some evidence to show the decomposition of GDP growth into the growth of two components: 
hours worked and labour productivity. An overall picture of cross-country differentials from 1995 
to 2007 is given in Table 1, which also shows data for contributions to labour productivity.  
The lowest position in terms of growth of value added is occupied by Italy,  with a rate of only 
1.42%, (column 1), mostly because of its collapse in productivity growth. It is followed by 
Germany where, however, the disappointing performance in output growth was primarily caused by 
a marked fall in hours worked. Conversely, at the top we find Ireland, Finland and Spain, but here 
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too the difference between the three economies is worthy of note, since Ireland and Spain had 
extensive growth as a consequence of the greater output contributed by hours worked, whereas 
Finland recorded an acceleration in productivity gains.  
Table 1 also shows that the slow productivity growth of the old member states of the European 
Union, below 2 percent, is a widespread phenomenon - with some notable exceptions, two in 
Northern Continental Europe, Finland and Sweden, and two in the Anglo-Saxon economies, Ireland 
and the UK. 
 
Table 1: Output, hours and productivity growth in European economies: 1995-2007 
(all sectors)  
 
Growth rate 
of Value 
Added
Hours 
Worked
Labour 
Productivity
Labour 
Composition
ICT capital 
per Hour
Non-ICT 
capital per 
Hour
TFP
LP 
contributions 
from 
knowledge 
economy
Austria 2.43 0.52 1.90 0.20 0.43 0.39 0.88 1.51
Belgium 2.13 0.63 1.50 0.21 0.77 0.74 -0.22 0.76
Denmark 1.87 0.83 1.03 0.10 0.84 0.38 -0.29 0.65
Finland 3.57 0.84 2.73 0.23 0.50 0.46 1.54 2.27
France 2.14 0.34 1.79 0.33 0.27 0.59 0.60 1.21
Germany 1.60 -0.09 1.69 -0.01 0.38 0.64 0.67 1.05
Ireland 6.94 1.93 5.01 0.54 0.41 3.46 0.61 1.56
Italy 1.42 0.65 0.77 0.12 0.25 0.70 -0.29 0.07
Netherlands 2.69 0.78 1.91 0.30 0.53 0.50 0.58 1.41
Spain 3.52 1.89 1.63 0.44 0.46 1.43 -0.69 0.21
Sweden 2.96 0.40 2.56 0.25 0.47 1.05 0.78 1.50
United Kingdom 2.72 0.60 2.13 0.43 0.74 0.58 0.38 1.56
Average (EU12) 2.83 0.78 2.06 0.26 0.51 0.91 0.38 1.15
Std. Dev. (EU12) 1.46 0.59 1.08 0.16 0.19 0.86 0.63 0.63
Czech Republic 2.74 -0.10 2.84 0.30 0.53 1.41 0.60 1.43
Hungary 3.92 0.23 3.67 0.61 0.30 0.36 2.40 3.32
Average (EU14) 2.90 0.68 2.23 0.29 0.49 0.91 0.54 1.32
Std. Dev.(EU14) 1.38 0.60 1.10 0.17 0.18 0.81 0.79 0.82
Output contribution from Labour productivity contributions from
 
Source: EU KLEMS database. Contribution from knowledge economies is obtained by summing 
labour composition, ICT capital per hour and TFP. Labour composition is measured by changes in 
terms of age, gender and educational attainments. EU KLEMS cross-classifies labour input by 
educational attainment, gender, and age (to proxy for work experience) into 18 labour categories, 
respectively 3 x 2 x 3 types; see van Ark et al. (2008, p. A2).  
 
Contributions to labour productivity growth reveal other cross-country diversities.  
 In Ireland, a significant increase in substitution of capital for labour and processes of deepening in 
(non-ICT) capital intensity are recorded. Similar measures characterised the mid-1970s to the late 
1980s when, on average, European countries engaged in catching up with the US (van Ark et al. 
,2008). For the other Anglo-Saxon country, the UK, two components of the knowledge economy 
(high quality of the labour workforce and capital ICT services) contribute to an important extent. 
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Lastly, the Northern countries, and Finland in particular, were the only economies in Europe which 
showed the indubitable incidence of TFP growth. 
Note, as already signalled by van Ark et al. (2008), that there is no significant slowdown in the 
quality of the labour force: the skill level of the workforce (captured by the labour composition 
effect) gives a positive contribution to efficiency growth (with the only exception of Germany). In 
addition, there is no large variation in labour composition effect across European countries, as 
shown by the standard deviations for EU12 and EU 14 (0.16 and 0.17, respectively).  
We also consider the summed contributions of three factors: changes in labour composition, mostly 
determined by greater demand for skilled workers; investments in information and communication 
technology, and TFP growth, the last component, as indicated by van Ark et al. (2008, p. 35), 
“might include the impact of intangible investments such as organizational changes related to the 
use of information technology”. Data for the period 1995-2007 show the lowest performances by 
Italy and Spain, while confirming the leading position of Finland.  
To better evaluate the relative importance of the various components, we computed their percentage 
contributions to labour productivity, as shown in Table 2. 
One of the main differences arising in the intra-European context is found not in differences in the 
intensity of the production factors, but in total factor productivity. Indeed, the standard deviation of 
TFP (32.79%) is much larger than that of the contribution of labour composition (6.54%) or of ICT 
and Non-ICT capital deepening (18.77 and 23.79%). This led us to extend analysis of TFP in terms 
of country-sectoral differentials. 
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Table 2: Productivity growth components, 1995-2007 
 (all sectors; percentage point contributions) 
 
Labour 
Composition
ICT capital 
per Hour
Non-ICT 
capital per 
Hour
TFP Labour Productivity
Austria 10.69 22.38 20.66 46.28 100
Belgium 13.84 51.47 49.52 -14.82 100
Denmark 9.77 81.29 37.03 -28.10 100
Finland 8.24 18.44 16.89 56.43 100
France 18.29 15.23 32.83 33.65 100
Germany -0.38 22.79 37.67 39.92 100
Ireland 10.76 8.20 68.96 12.08 100
Italy 15.43 32.16 90.52 -38.11 100
Netherlands 15.66 27.96 26.24 30.14 100
Portugal 26.76 28.01 87.32 -42.09 100
Spain 9.94 18.42 41.19 30.45 100
Sweden 20.12 34.79 27.10 17.98 100
United Kingdom 12.72 24.57 44.26 18.45 100
Average (EU12) 13.22 29.67 44.63 12.48
Std. Dev. (EU12) 6.54 18.77 23.79 32.79
Czech Republic 10.47 18.85 49.56 21.12 100
Hungary 16.61 8.27 9.68 65.44 100
Average (EU14) 13.26 27.52 42.63 16.59
Std. Dev.(EU14) 6.17 18.39 23.87 33.31
 
Source: EU KLEMS database. 
 
4.2 TFP and country-sectoral differentials 
 
Many factors may cause changes in TFP, since this residual measure includes disembodied 
technological change, organisational improvements, and effects from unmeasured output and inputs 
which may be captured by R&D expenses. Hence, in addition to technical innovation, there are: i) 
effects due to organisational and institutional changes, ii) shifts in returns to scale, iii) any other 
deviations from competitive assumptions of equalities between prices and marginal costs; iv) all 
computing errors due to the existence of unmeasured inputs. All these effects cause different TFP 
contributions to economic growth at country and sectoral level, as shown in Figure 1.  
One general finding, common to almost all countries, is the positive and remarkable contribution of 
TFP in manufacturing. For a plausible explanation, we must recall that TFP, as a residual measure, 
includes measurement errors: R&D and other intangible assets are the most prominent examples 
causing statistical errors when computing inputs. This component has great importance in 
manufacturing (Eurostat, 2010, p.52).  
A second finding concerns the positive contribution of TFP to productivity growth in the Wholesale 
and Retail sector (see Figure 1). One probable explanation, as stressed in van Ark et al.(2008), is 
that the ample diffusion of chain stores and inventory systems applied to the trade sector are 
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prominent examples of sectors where returns to scale, as already observed for the American 
economy (Foster et al., 2006), have played a significant role and explain faster growth in TFP. 
Good performance was also found in Agriculture and Transport, Storage and Communications. One 
reason for this finding in Transport and Communications concerns the role of deregulation and 
changes in entry barriers, since the removal of restrictions encourages innovation and promotes 
growth (Aghion and Griffith, 2005). These effects were empirically tested by Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003), who examined the role of entry liberalisation in market services and found a 
positive spill-over effect on manufacturing but, unexpectedly, no benefits in services. These 
paradoxical results may be due to some statistical problems, since deregulations were introduced in 
Europe at different times in different industries, but their aggregation into broad sectors does not 
allow us to isolate the single institutional innovation and causes insufficient change over time of the 
explanatory variables which represent these innovations. Inklaar et al. (2008) report that moving to 
a more detailed analysis for individual service sectors is convenient, since it overcomes these 
problems; in particular, for Post and Telecommunications, the authors demonstrate that the effect of 
barriers to entry has a negative and significant effect on TFP growth, whereas no significant effects 
are detected for Transport and Storage. One explanation is “that the change in barriers to entry for 
the post telecommunication services was so strong that its effects became identifiable through the 
general noise in the data, while this was not the case in transport” (Inklaar et al., 2008, p. 167). In 
our study, in which the two sectors (Transport and Storage, Post and Telecommunications) are not 
considered separately, we simply find, on average, good results in terms of TFP growth in various 
countries, as shown in Figure 1. Performances in other services, such as hotels and restaurants, 
financial sectors or social and personal services, are more disappointing. In these cases, some 
failures due to the increasing use of fixed-term contracts may have been some of these 
organisational and institutional changes behind the TFP patterns. This point is examined in the next 
section. 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Contributions of TFP to growth of sectoral added value European economy 1995-2007 
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 Figure 1 (continued): Contributions of TFP to growth of sectoral added value European Economy 1995-2007 
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4.3 Labour Protection  
 
This section concerns job protection across countries and the most important changes which have 
characterised the European economies and which may have influenced their performance in terms 
of innovation and productivity.  
Job protection considered in most of the estimates of the present paper is measured by using two 
time-varying cross-country data: the OECD Employment Protection Legislation index (EPL) for 
regular contracts (EPLR) and, for temporary contracts (EPLT). 
The EPLR OECD index refers to eight items which weigh three major groups of restrictions: i) 
procedural inconvenience (such as notification procedures), ii) severance pay, and iii) difficulty of 
individual dismissals (definition of unfair dismissal and related items). The EPLT index includes 
norms for fixed-term contracts and temporary work agency employment. For both types of contract, 
the OECD sub-indexes include information on the valid cases for which these types of contracts are 
legal, restrictions on the number of renewals, and their maximum cumulated duration (OECD, 
2004).  
Our baseline regressions do not include the OECD indicator which covers a third area, i.e., 
restrictions on collective dismissals (EPLC). EPLC has only been available since 1998 and this does 
not allow comparisons over our observation period (1995-2007). In any case, for robustness checks, 
we also perform a set of estimates to test the role of EPLC and following Bassanini et al., (2009) 
introduce an aggregate indicator, obtained by a weighted average of EPLR (time-varying) and the 
1998 value of EPLC. Note also that the information for EPLC for the years 1998-2007 confirm no 
changes in the restrictiveness of collective dismissals in our sampled European economies, with 
only two exceptions, Denmark and Finland where, however, only minor changes were made. 
A general look shows considerable variations across EU economies, not only in the stringency of 
aggregate values of EPL (obtained by weighting EPLR, EPLT and EPLC), but also in the stance of 
these different components. There are economies, such as that of the United Kingdom, where all the 
various kinds of restrictions are small, but there are other countries where stringency widely differs 
by component. A case in point is Italy, with the highest EPLC values throughout our observation 
period (4.88) but where EPLR (1.77) is less than the EU average (Figure 3)3.  
In recent years, one of the main innovations in European labour markets has been new legislation 
for temporary job contracts. Reforms for these types of contracts have characterised various 
countries and have been more important than changes in rules for regular contracts. Indeed, the 
                                                            
3All OECD EPL indexes are measured on a 0-6 scale, from least to most restrictive. 
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changes recorded for our sampled countries, as shown in Figure 2, confirm that the greatest 
relaxation in strictness of rules is recorded for temporary contracts.  
Figure 2: Changes in employment protection in EU countries 1995-2007 
-4.0 -3.5 -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
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Belgium
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Denmark
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Changes in EPLT Changes in EPLR
 
Source: OECD  
A broad picture of cross-country differences in EPLR shows that low and high EPLR countries 
have kept statutory protection of regular jobs almost unchanged (see also Venn, 2009). The highest 
easing is recorded in Austria, which has adopted a reform entailing only half a point reduction in 
the EPLR index (which ranges from 0 to 6), followed by Spain and the Netherlands (with 
reductions of 0.31 and 0.20, respectively). Conversely, Germany has slightly strengthened high 
protection for permanent workers (+ 0.32). A better visualisation of the stability of protection of 
regular workers is given in Figure 3, which compares the stance of policies in 1995 and 2007 on 
individual and collective dismissals, quite unchanged throughout the EU economies. 
The EPLT values shown in Figure 4 confirm the “highly selective approach” already signalled by 
Brandt et al. (2005). The figure shows the starting point of each EPLT country and its evolution up 
to 2007. Three groups of countries emerge. The first comprises five economies, characterised by 
increased protection over the period 1995-2007: Hungary, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Spain and 
the UK. These data also show that, with the exception of Spain, the initial EPLT levels in these 
countries were very low. Spain, which had liberalised the labour market in the early 1990s, later 
eased restrictions on temporary contracts, but temporary employment regulations in 2007 were still 
more stringent than the EU average. 
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The second group comprises economies where changes did not occur (France, Finland, Denmark, 
Austria), and the third group consists of countries which lowered the level of protection for 
temporary workers, probably because of higher initial levels. In this group, we find Italy, which in 
1995 had the strictest regulations for temporary contracts, and later adopted large-scale 
liberalisation for them, facilitating the use of a multiplicity of atypical contracts. This process led to 
a reduction of the EPLT index by 3.5 points (which also ranges from 0 to 6). Significant easing was 
recorded in Belgium (but with a lower reduction, of 2 points), a country which in 1995 had strict 
norms for temporary jobs.  
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Figure 3: Employment protection of regular contracts in EU countries 
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Figure 4: Employment protection of temporary contracts in US and EU countries, 1995-2007 
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Although the role of changes in EPL is a matter for further study by means of econometric 
estimates, some evidence on the actual implementation of norms for fixed-term contracts are 
interesting.  
Figure 5 shows that one group of economies has increased the adoption of these contracts. This 
group contains Italy, the country which has recorded the largest liberalisation of temporary jobs 
(i.e., the sharpest decline in EPLT) and also the highest acceleration of temporary jobs, with an 
annual average growth of more than 5%. Increases in these shares, around 4%, have been recorded 
in Belgium and the Netherlands, two countries which have also eased restrictions on these kinds of 
contracts. 
A second group comprises economies (Spain, UK, Denmark, Ireland, Finland) which have recorded 
negative growth of the proportion of temporary workers (Figure 5), and they are all countries which 
have raised or kept unchanged their protection of temporary workers between 1995-2007 (Figure 3). 
The only exception is Hungary, which shows small positive growth in the proportion of temporary 
jobs, notwithstanding a slight increase in EPLT.  
20 
 
Our data also suggest that catching-up effects due to the use of temporary workers are negligible. In 
fact, by omitting the outlier case of our sample, Spain, we obtain a correlation of -0.34 between the 
share of temporary contracts and the average annual growth of those shares. This means that trends 
in the proportions of fixed-term contracts are weakly explained by their initial levels. Instead, 
complementary effects between protection of temporary and regular workers play a major role. For 
example, in 1995 the proportions of temporary workers in the UK, Italy, Belgium and Austria were 
very similar (6.77%, 7.21%, 5.31%, 5.99%, respectively). However, interesting divergences 
emerged in the following years, when the last three countries did not ease their strict legislation for 
regular workers but significantly liberalised the hiring of temporary workers, thus causing a 
considerable increase in the use of temporary contracts. In sum, our data suggest that changes in 
employment protection legislations are correlated with differing recourse to temporary contracts, 
and led us to explore their effects on productivity. 
Figure 6 compares 1995 and 2007 proportions of temporary contracts (as shares of total 
employment) and shows that in many countries (UK, Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, 
Hungary, Czech Republic) recourse to temporary workers remains below the EU average, in both 
years. Conversely, we find a restricted group recording high, persistent proportions of temporary 
workers, again in 1995 and 2007 (Spain, Sweden, Finland). Lastly, there are a few economies (the 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy), which have recorded increasing use of temporary workers, a fact 
which, in 2007,  led them to record above (or nearly above) the sample average. 
Before discussing econometric results, it is useful to observe that the UK, as mentioned above, is a 
benchmark country in that it has the least protection for both regular and temporary workers, in 
comparison with other EU countries of our sample, without significant policy turnarounds (see also 
Figures 3 and 4). It also shows the lowest levels of proportions of temporary workers (Figure 6). 
Data by sector confirm that the UK is a benchmark, since both at the beginning and at end of the 
period its propensity to use temporary workers was much lower than the EU sample average (Figure 
7).  
Data on sectoral propensities to use temporary workers reveal uniform patterns across countries: in 
both the UK and other EU countries, we find the same group of industries with higher shares of 
temporary jobs (Agriculture, Hotels and Restaurants, Construction, Community, Social and 
Personal Services, Finance and Business Services). Conversely, trends by sectors are quite 
different. In Agriculture and services we note a falling trend in these arrangements in the UK, but 
increasing importance in EU countries. 
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Figure 5: Growth of proportion of temporary workers with respect to initial levels 
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Figure 6: Proportion of temporary workers at beginning and end of period 
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Figure 7 Proportion of temporary workers by sector at beginning and end of period 1995-2007  
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5. Econometric analysis  
5.1 Estimation strategy 
In this section we focus on the causal relationship between protection of temporary workers 
(EPLT) and total factor productivity growth (TFP). We also include other control variables, 
i.e. protection of regular workers (EPLR); disembodied innovation (captured by R&D 
intensity) and product market regulation (PMR). 
The empirical strategy is based on the assumption that EPLT influences efficiency growth in 
those sectors which need more flexibility to be successful and adjust employment more than 
others. We thus exploit differences across sectors to implement a difference-in-difference 
method for our sample of 10 industries in 14 EU economies. In this sample, we test the 
hypothesis that lower restrictions depress TFP growth in those industries where the 
propensity to use flexible employment arrangements are higher. This propensity is measured 
in the UK, since this country has the lowest employment protection levels, for both 
temporary and regular workers, as noted above. We assume that the differences in 
propensity to assume temporary workers in the UK are only motivated by technological and 
other sector-specific factors, irrespective of influences caused by protection legislation. 
More precisely, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Bassanini et al. (2009), we assume 
that the difference in TFP growth between any pair of industries (h and k) is equal to the 
expected value (E) of a function of EPLT and its change, multiplied by a function g of the 
difference between the propensity to employ temporary workers which we find in the two 
industries. We also assume that f is linear and g is an identity function g(x) = x. We obtain: 
 
))Λg(Λ∆ELPT),Λg(Λf(ELPT=]TFP∆TFPE[∆ hkithk1itihtikt −−− −lnln  
where  TFPikt denotes TFP in country i and time t, k, and h index the pair of industries, and  
Λ is the average sectoral propensity to use temporary workers over the period 1995-2007 in 
the benchmark country (the UK). The difference in the “natural” propensity to employ 
temporary workers among various industries, multiplied by the different stringency of EPLT 
across the countries of our sample, explains the differences in TFP growth rates at sector-
country level. 
We adopt a similar strategy for protection of regular workers (EPLR). In this case, Λ is the 
average lay-off propensity over the period 2001-2007 in the benchmark country (UK). Since 
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we find a weak negative correlation between lay-off propensity and the propensity to 
employ temporary workers4, in some specifications we also interact the latter with EPLR. 
In addition, our linear regression model includes Product Market Regulation (PMR) and 
innovation, proxied by R&D intensity. These variables are taken at sector-country level and 
also work as controls. We therefore we estimated the following equation: 
 
where i = 14 countries, j = 10 sectors, t = 1995,…2007, and EPL is the overall indicator, 
obtained by considering EPLT and EPLR, in turn multiplied by Λ, the indicator equal to the 
average industry propensity to use temporary workers in the years of our observation period. 
We also include country by year dummies, Dit  and sector dummies  Dj  to control for highly 
sector-specific factors which probably influenced TFP growth and which cannot be captured 
by means of the labour policy control variables included in our analysis. For instance, 
unemployment protection, measured by replacement ratios and duration of unemployment 
benefits, should be included as determinants of TFP, but are omitted due to the lack of 
availability of time-varying data.  
Lastly, we also control for the distance from the technological frontier by inserting the 
indicator mentioned in section 3. 
 
The only difference in this second specification is the insertion of log Rel TFP, the distance 
from the technological frontier, and Dit, the sector by year dummies. This allows us to omit 
controlling for the growth rate of the industry productivity frontier, as reported in Bassanini 
et al. (2009). 
It must be remarked that specific tests check both heteroscedasticity across panels and 
autocorrelation within panels. This is why we fitted a panel-data linear model by using the 
feasible generalized least squares method5. The results are shown below. 
 
 
 
                                                            
4This negative correlation (Spearman rank correlation -0.31) is not surprising. Indeed, the highest 
propensity to lay off regular workers in the UK is a consequence of the lowest protection against 
individual dismissals. This also explains the low recourse to temporary workers. 
5All estimates were carried out by STATA 10. Routines adopted, preliminary and post-estimate tests 
are available upon request. 
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5.2 Econometric results  
5.2.1 Effects of regulation of temporary workers 
This subsection presents our main results. Table 3 lists the estimates for the baseline 
specifications testing the role of job protection for temporary and regular contracts (EPLT 
and EPLR) and their changes (∆EPLT and ∆ EPLR). As noted above, the effects of EPLT 
on total factor productivity growth were estimated by means of a difference-in-difference 
model on industry-level data, the assumption being that the effect of liberalisation policies 
for temporary jobs on TFP growth is greater in industries where the propensity to use 
temporary contracts (“policy-binding industries”) is higher. 
Analogously, we estimated the role of EPLR on TFP growth assuming that the effect of 
liberalisations of regular jobs is more important in industries where the layoff propensity is 
higher (“policy-binding industries”) (see Bassanini et al., 2009). 
The UK temporary contract rates or lay-off rates for each industry are thus used to proxy for 
the natural propensity of industries to make high recourse to numerical flexibility in labour 
arrangements.  
Table 3 shows the positive influence that protection of fixed-term and temporary work 
agency (EPLT) exert on TFP growth: both variables, EPLT and ∆ EPLT, induce increases in 
differences in TFP growth between the two sectors.  
Let us now consider the role of EPLT. According to our estimates, one-point restriction on 
this legislation should increase by 0.10-0.12 percentage points the difference in TFP growth 
between two industries whose average propensity to employ temporary workers rate differs 
by 1 percentage point. Note that, even if the estimated effect for EPLT appears to be small, 
it is not negligible, since it depends both on the magnitude of change in the EPL indicator 
and on sectoral propensities to employ temporary workers. An interesting case in point is 
Italy, the country of our sample, which has made the most radical changes in relaxing 
temporary job provisions and at the same time recorded the worst performance in efficiency 
growth. Let us consider the case of two Italian industries: i) Financial Intermediation, Real 
Estate and Business Services and ii) Manufacturing. The first sector has shown higher use 
(an average difference around 2.40 percentage points over the period 1995-2007) of 
temporary contracts with respect to the other. According to our estimates, the difference in 
TFP annual growth between these two sectors would have increased by 0.24 percentage 
points in favour of the former for each easing of EPLT by 1 point. This also implies that, if 
from the mid-1990s Italy had not lowered restrictions for temporary contracts by 3.5 points, 
the difference in the cumulate growth rates of TFP between the same industries would be 
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10.9 percentage points higher in favour of Finance Real Estate and Business Services 
(instead of the differential rate of 3% actually obtained). 
The underlying propensity to use temporary contracts and make workforce adjustments in 
the absence of EPLT regulation has been also proxied by industry-level UK lay-off rates – 
defined as the percentage ratio of annual redundancies to total employment – as done by 
Bassanini et al. (2009)6. Our results show that using lay-off rates is not a good choice for 
testing the role of EPLT, as revealed by the non-significant effect shown in our estimates 
(column 2), and our preferred specifications (see also other estimates reported below) 
include the share of temporary workers7.  
Our findings also signal no significant effects of restrictions for regular jobs and their 
changes, as seen from the non-significant coefficients for EPLR and ∆EPLR. Analogous 
non-significant effects are obtained for both the lay-off-based and temporary-based 
classifications of EPL-binding industries (columns 4 and 5). Controlling for EPLR, we 
further have checked our main results and have found that the estimated effect of EPLT is 
negative and significant and has approximately the same magnitude (see columns 4 and 5).  
Lastly, the estimates of Table 3 have two important specific controls. Countries may be in 
different stages of their development and exposed to different demand dynamics; we thus 
inserted country-time dummies in all specifications, to take into account country-specific 
development and business cycle effects. In addition, we include sector dummies, since 
different industries may be in very different stages of their life-cycles and industry-specific 
effects must also be taken into account.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6The authors also use alternative indicators, such as turnover rates, which are more appropriate than 
lay-off rates to test the role of EPLT 
7 We also ran all specifications listed in Table 3 with interaction terms EPLT x Lay Off and ∆ EPLT 
x Lay Off, but found that the coefficients were never significantly different from zero. All these 
results, not reported in Table 3 for reasons of space, are available upon request.  
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Table 3: TFP estimates for  period 1995-2007, baseline specifications 
Obs. 1670 1169 1670 1670 1670 
Groups 140 140 140 140 140 
      
Dependent Variable: TFP (growth rate) 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Explanatory variables      
EPLT x Temporary Workers Share 0.103***  0.105*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 
 (0.026)  (0.027) (0.017) (0.028) 
EPLT x Lay Off  0.009    
  (0.031)    
∆EPLT x Temporary Workers Share    0.004** 0.004* 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
EPLR x Lay Off   -0.022 -0.019  
   (0.063) (0.063)  
∆EPLR x Lay Off    0.011  
    (0.013)  
EPLR x Temporary Workers Share     -0.040 
     (0.052) 
∆EPLR x Temporary Workers Share     -0.002 
     (0.009) 
Country -by-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Wald chi2 663.17 391.75 659.77 669.61 676.75 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
 
 
5.2.2 Robustness checks 
 
Product market regulation and R&D may induce changes in TFP growth. As seen above, in our 
sample some sectors had better TFP performance than others, indicating that there are important 
product market characteristics which determine these outcomes. One probable candidate is the 
degree of competition, which varies across industries.  
There is now a consensus view that product market regulation (PMR) has an autonomous effect on 
cross-industry productivity differences, since competition may boost innovation and growth. Two 
main channels can be identified to explain this causal link: i) competition stimulates incumbent 
companies to increase their TFP by adopting new technologies and innovations; ii) and favours a 
process of creative destruction generated by the entry of new innovators and exit of former 
innovators, as clearly shown in the new Schumpeterian approach proposed by Aghion and Griffith 
(2005).  
Within the EU, regulatory reforms have never differed so greatly as in recent times, and the 
different pace of product market reforms may contribute towards explaining EU divergences in 
TFP. This point has been stressed by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) in presenting OECD evidence 
for regulation and productivity growth. They signal that “regulatory policies diverged in relative 
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terms, with a widening variance of approaches across countries in the most recent period. 
Paradoxically, the recent divergence in policies is widest within the EU, despite efforts by the 
European Commission to harmonize the business environment in the Single Market.”(p. 18). In 
addition, most of the regulatory reforms were driven by sector-specific easing of regulation.  
Previous works have verified these hypotheses and estimated the role of product market regulation 
through cross-country studies. Among others, the study mentioned above, Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
(2003) tested the role of PMR on total factor productivity for a sample of 23 industries in 18 OECD 
countries over the period 1984-1998. They found that productivity growth was closely and 
positively linked to liberalisation of product markets, suggesting that limited regulatory reforms 
may contribute to explaining the poor performance of European countries, especially in sectors 
where Europe has accumulated a technology gap.  
In our study, we also address the importance of sector-specific regulatory interventions by including 
time-varying measures of product market regulation (PMR) differentiated by sector. We also 
control for the role of changes in PMR to capture the role of modifications in competition in each 
industry by using the OECD indicator updated to 2007. Lastly, we include as sectoral covariates not 
only time-varying measures of product market regulation, but also by-sector R&D. The results are 
reported in Table 4. 
Our results confirm the significant role played by the regulatory framework, since we find that TFP 
improves more in sectors where PMR is lower (column 1), which means that organisational 
improvements, captured by the residual measure TFP, are more likely to be adopted where firms are 
operating in competitive product markets. We also include changes in PMR and find that all these 
covariates have the expected negative sign, although they are not always significant.  
The second sectoral covariate is R&D intensity (Table 4, columns 3 and 4). We expect, as clearly 
reported by Inklaar et al. (2008, p. 148-149), that many factors cause changes in TFP, including all 
computing errors due to the existence of unmeasured inputs.8Our estimates for R&D confirm this 
hypothesis. It is worth noting that, even with these controls, EPLT exerts a positive influence on 
TFP growth.  
 
 
 
                                                            
8
  A recent work documents the importance of computing intangible assets to obtain more precise 
estimates of TFP (Corrado et al., 2009). From their case-study on the the US non-farm business sector, the 
authors find that the average annual growth of total factor productivity for the period 1995-2003 falls from 
1.42 to 1.08 when intangibles are included. They show that “On the input side, intangibles reached parity 
with tangible capital as a source of growth after 1995, and when the two are combined, capital deepening 
supplants MFP as the principal source of growth” (p. 683). 
29 
 
Table 4: TFP estimates  for period 1995-2007, inclusion of PMR and R&D 
Obs. 1670 1670 1471 1471 
Groups 140 140 130 130 
     
Dependent Variable: TFP (growth rate) 1 2 3 4 
     
Explanatory variables     
EPLT x Temporary Workers Share 0.094*** 0.114*** 0.122*** 0.141*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.019) 
∆EPLT x Temporary Workers Share  0.004*  0.004* 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
EPLR x Lay Off -0.021 -0.018 -0.032 -0.012 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.057) (0.064) 
∆EPLR x Lay Off  -0.008  0.002 
  (0.013)  (0.013) 
PMR -0.024* -0.015 -0.028* -0.018 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
∆PMR  -0.074**  -0.088*** 
  (0.029)  (0.028) 
R&D   
0.266*** 
(0.006) 
0.249*** 
(0.065) 
     
Country-by-time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Wald chi2 655.32 658.70 405.66 661.99 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
 
5.2.3 Augmented model: the distance from the technological frontier and other controls 
The final set of estimates includes the variable Rel TFP, which measures the distance from the 
technological frontier of a given industry and is defined as the difference between the log of TFP in 
industry j, country i, time t, and the log of TFP country leader in the same industry, at the same 
time. Hence, the country-industry having the maximum TFP among all sample countries in a given 
year is identified as the technological leader for that year. Catch-up implies that the country-sector 
is able to shorten the distance from the frontier and, according to this hypothesis, the expected sign 
for Rel TFP is negative. Our findings support the convergence hypothesis, as shown by the negative 
and significant coefficient for Rel TFP in all specifications (Table 5, panel A, columns 1-4).  
Until now, we have tested the role of protection of regular workers, focussing only on firing costs 
for individual dismissals and obtaining their irrelevance on TFP growth. A robustness check has 
been performed by including, as done by Bassannini, Nunziata and Venn (2009), a refined indicator 
of EPLR which also takes collective dismissals into account9. Replacing EPLR with the new and 
more comprehensive indicator, the estimated effects for regulations on individual and collective 
                                                            
9
  This indicator is computed as the weighted average of EPLR (time-varying) and EPLC (in 1998) 
with weights 5/7 and 2/7. 
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dismissals remain non-significant, whereas temporary protection is still positive and significant 
(Table 5, Panel B). 
These results appear to be robust to the last sensitivity test, performed by excluding the aggregate of 
‘Community, Social, Personal Services and No-Market Services’ (Table 6, columns 1-4). The 
elimination of this sector, which includes government, health and education, is due to measurement 
problems, which make calculations of output and productivity highly problematic, thus justifying its 
exclusion, as done in similar analyses (see also EU KLEMS guidelines, 2007)10. Our findings, 
restricted to market economy, confirm significant and negative effects of EPLT: lower restrictions 
on temporary jobs have negative effects in industries of the market economy where, in the absence 
of regulations, firms tend to rely on short-term positions to make workforce changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10
 http://www.euklems.net/. 
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Table 5: TFP estimates – inclusion of distance from technological frontier 
PANEL A (period 1995-2007) 
Obs. 1418 1418 1257 1257 
Groups 119 119 111 111 
Dependent Variable: TFP (growth rate) 1 2 3 4 
     
Explanatory variables     
Rel TFP  
-1.593*** 
(0.385) 
-1.533*** 
(0.387) 
-1.342*** 
(0.420) 
-1.265*** 
(0.423) 
     
EPLT x Temporary Workers Share 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) 
∆EPLT x Temporary Workers Share  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.003) 
EPLR x Lay Off -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 0.003 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.061) 
∆EPLR x Lay Off  -0.007  0.000 
  (0.012)  (0.013) 
PMR -0.091*** -0.085*** -0.104*** -0.095*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
∆PMR  -0.056*  -0.072** 
  (0.030)  (0.030) 
R&D   
0.226*** 
(0.076) 
0.232*** 
(0.075) 
     
Country-by-Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-by-Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald chi2 939.74 934.91 832.10 842.76 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PANEL B (refined EPLR, period 1998-2007) 
Obs. 1061 1061 975 975 
Groups 119 119 111 111 
Dependent Variable: TFP (growth rate) 1 2 3 4 
     
Explanatory variables     
Rel TFP  
-1.328*** 
(0.403) 
-1.276*** 
(0.406) 
-1.396*** 
(0.459) 
-1.331*** 
(0.460) 
     
EPLT x Temporary Workers Share 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.171*** 0.167*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035) 
∆EPLT x Temporary Workers Share  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
EPLR(individual and collective dismissals) 
 x Lay Off 
-0.013 -0.028 0.000 -0.010 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.085) (0.086) 
∆EPLR(individual and collective dismissals)  
x Lay Off 
 -0.009  -0.014 
  (0.019)  (0.019) 
PMR -0.046** -0.041** -0.052** -0.048** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
∆PMR  -0.050*  -0.058* 
  (0.030)  (0.031) 
R&D   
0.186** 
(0.086) 
0.197** 
(0.086) 
Country-by-Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-by-Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald chi2 832.33 837.77 801.18 803.91 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
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Table 6: TFP estimates for period  1995-2007, inclusions of distance from – market economy 
Obs. 1275 1275 1119 1119 
Groups 107 107 99 99 
     
Dependent Variable: TFP (growth rate) 1 2 3 4 
     
Explanatory variables     
Rel TFP  
-1.492*** 
(0.398) 
-1.451*** 
(0.399) 
-1.280*** 
(0.427) 
-1.209*** 
(0.431) 
     
EPLT x Temporary Workers Share 0.084** 0.092** 0.126*** 0.128*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.045) (0.047) 
∆EPLT x Temporary Workers Share  0.002  -0.0005 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
EPLR x Lay Off -0.009 -0.012 -0.016 -0.027 
 (0.098) (0.102) (0.099) (0.103) 
∆EPLR x Lay Off  0.012 
(0.020) 
 0.013 
    (0.022) 
PMR -0.096*** -0.088*** -0.106*** -0.097*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) 
∆PMR  -0.055*  -0.071** 
  (0.032)  (0.032) 
R&D   
0.198*** 
(0.080) 
0.201*** 
(0.080) 
     
Country-by-Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-by-Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Wald chi2 889.70 890.44 799.92 817.27 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
 
Summing up, our results confirm the negative influence of liberalising fixed-term and temporary 
work employment, which probably tends to discourage training and the acquisition of firm-specific 
skills. These results are explained by the model formalized by Ricci and Waldmann (2010). In the 
context of a typical situation faced by young, newly hired workers in economies where workers are 
liquidity-constrained, those  workers cannot afford the cost of training by accepting a wage cut – 
with the implicit promise of receiving some kind of training financed by the firm. In addition, under 
contract incompleteness, this promise is not enforceable and there will be hold-up problems, the 
consequence being that firms will train less than would be socially optimal. In such a situation, the 
introduction of a small (or a positive change in) firing tax for new hired workers would increase 
training and productivity. All our findings give support to these claims. 
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Conclusions 
 
We find that, since 1995, EU countries have not followed homogenous patterns of growth, and 
further heterogeneity has been caused by sectoral diversities: between-sector gaps are crucial and 
the worst performances of total factor productivity are recorded in some service sectors.  
We have analysed these country-sector disparities in 14 EU economies and then have focussed on 
some driving forces such as the stringency of employment protection of temporary jobs. Our 
empirical results suggest that liberalisation has had a detrimental influence on TFP, especially in 
sectors where firms are more used to opening short-term positions.  
One interpretation of these findings is that low levels of employee protection, discouraging long-
term relationships, do not offer incentives for workers to upgrade their skills and produce under 
training investments financed by firms. Our results, obtained including the sectoral dimension, 
show that, in industries where the propensity to use flexible labour arrangements is higher, labour 
deregulation may have perverse effects. In contrast, we find no evidence of significant effects of 
reforms concerning regular contracts for the years 1995-2007. 
Our estimates also confirm the significant role played by the regulatory framework, since we find 
that TFP has improved more in sectors where PMR is lower, which means that organisational 
improvements, captured by the residual measure TFP, are more likely to be adopted where firms 
operate in competitive product markets. Expectedly, efficiency does accelerate with distance to the 
technological frontier. 
These findings have been validated by various robustness checks. We have controlled for 
employment protection of regular workers, considering restrictions on individual and collective 
dismissals, and have used alternative indicators for the propensity to use flexible employment 
arrangements. Lastly, our regressions cover whole sectors, but are also restricted to the market 
economy, the growth accounting of which is affected by minor measurement problems. 
Concerning policy implications, our first general consideration refers to the opposite effects which 
liberalisation of the labour and product markets have produced over the years 1995-2007, 
characterised by remarkable recourse in various EU economies to fixed-term contracts. For these 
years, unlike other studies focussing on the mid-1980s to the early 2000s, we have found that 
protection for regular workers did not play any significant role, whereas protection for temporary 
workers and pro-competitive product market policies did. In other words, deregulation of the 
product market probably plays a positive role in efficiency growth, whereas liberalisation of the 
labour market for temporary contracts negatively offsets this positive influence. 
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In addition, our results suggest that the scope of two-tier reforms seems to be limited, not only in 
terms of non-lasting employment growth (as shown in other studies, e.g., Boeri and Garibaldi, 
2007), but also on efficiency grounds. Countries can reach the same level of aggregate labour 
flexibility, but they reach different TFP performance when they choose a different composition of 
regular and temporary restrictions. If firms in high-EPL countries can circumvent strict regulations 
by hiring workers for short-term jobs, they pay for this form of liberalisation in terms of poor TFP 
improvements.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1:  DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
TFP (growth rate) Growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (sectoral-country data) 
Source: EU KLEMS database 
EPLT  
Employment Protection of Temporary Contracts. 
Source: OECD 
Temporary workers 
share  
 
Share of Temporary Contracts (fixed-term and temporary 
employment): sectoral-country data.  
Source: EUROSTAT 
EPLR  
Employment protection of  regular workers against individual 
dismissal 
Source: OECD 
EPLR 
(individual and 
collective dismissals) 
Index of employment protection for regular contracts including 
additional provisions for collective dismissals: weighted average of 
EPLR and EPLC, with weights 5/7 and 2/7, respectively. 
 
Source: our elaborations of OECD indicators. 
PMR  Product  Market Regulation  Source: OECD 
R&D Sectoral R&D expenses standardised to value added Source: EUROSTAT 
Rel TFP  
Difference between log of TFP in industry j, country I, time t, and 
log of European productivity frontier for that industry. frontier 
defined for each industry as country with highest level of TFP. 
Source: Our elaborations of EUKLEMS and OECD databases 
Lay-off UK Lay-off rates: UK  Source: Quarterly Labour Force surveys, UK 
Lay-off US Lay-off rates: US  CPS Displaced Workers Supplement, UK 
 
